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11. Introduction
In principle, innovations are not based on activities of a single firm only. Most innovation
activities involve multiple actors. The development of new and improved products rather
requires an active search-process involving several firms and institutions to tap new sources of
knowledge and technology (De Bresson, 1996; Nooteboom, 1999; von Hippel, 1988). Exchange
of information and resources with different partners are important factors in the innovation
process. By this, firms become more and more dependent on the know-how of other companies
and institutions.
Firms that engage in innovation activities are aware of the necessity to establish R&D
cooperation to obtain expertise which can not be generated inhouse. Such cooperations are
defined as collaborations to achieve a common goal that is to develop new and improved
products (technologies).1 Within a more or less durable constellation of agreements between two
or more partners, assets and activities are pooled, and combined. Thus, technological capabilities
to develop product and process innovations can be improved.2
The importance of R&D cooperation has risen steadily as a consequence of growing complexity,
risks and costs of innovation (Coombs et al., 1996; Dogson, 1993; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1992). Inter-firm collaborations occur especially within technology based industries. Arora and
Gambardella (1994) demonstrate the high importance of R&D collaborations for large US
chemical and pharmaceutical companies in the biotechnology sector. Colombo (1995) provides
empirical evidence of complementary relationship between inter-firm cooperative arrangements
and R&D intensity for a representative sample of international firms in the information
technology industries (semi-conductor, data processing and telecommunications). Veugelers
(1997) identifies significant positive effects of R&D cooperation in the Flemish manufacturing
industry on the level of R&D investments but only if firms have established absorptive capacities
as a full-time staffed R&D department. By this, R&D active Flemish firms are found to be more
frequently engaged in technological cooperations, the more they spend on inhouse R&D.
For Germany, the influence of R&D cooperation on the intensity of firms’ innovation activities is
less investigated. Recent studies have focussed on the role of inter-organizational arrangements
                                                
1 Various definitions of R&D (technological) cooperation exist. For an overview see: Child and Faulkner, 1998;
Hagedoorn, 1993; Mariti and Smiley, 1983.
2 Technological capabilities are defined as the ability to allocate the resources available within the firm in such a
way that competitive products will be developed and produced (Cantwell, 1994; Teece and Pisano, 1994).
2in single industries and the importance of specific types of R&D cooperation. For example,
Peters and Becker (1999) have investigated the role of R&D cooperation with universities in the
German automobile industry. Formal R&D arrangements with universities are preferred because
automobile suppliers can enhance their inhouse capacities and use their automobile-specific
potentials more efficiently. By establishing cooperative R&D arrangements, suppliers rather save
R&D costs than realize quality improvements of products.
Becker and Peters (2000) found empirical evidence in the German manufacturing industry that
R&D cooperation with universities enhance the probability of R&D and increase the R&D
investment of firms. This underlines the complementary effect of joint R&D with such research
partners. Firms cooperating with universities invest more in the development and improvement
of products than companies that do not cooperate with universities. Fritsch and Lukas (1999)
identify similar patterns for manufacturing enterprises in three German regions. They found
differences in firms’ R&D cooperation behaviour concerning the prospensity to collaborate with
others in R&D and the kind of cooperation partners.
This paper picks up these specific results and investigates the role of R&D cooperation for firms
in the German manufacturing industry from a broader perspective. In doing so, the issue in this
paper is novel in two points. The analysis is concentrated on the impact of R&D cooperation - in
line with other factors - on firm’s innovation input and output. Furthermore, it will be
investigated how the number of cooperation partners affects the development of new and
improved products.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the innovation effects of R&D cooperation are
discussed from a theoretical point of view. A formal analysis is neglected since the focus is put
on the elaboration of expected effects of R&D cooperation on firm’s innovation behaviour. The
discussion is emphasized on the formulation of core arguments and their interdependencies.
Section 3 describes data set, variables used and estimation methods for the empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents estimation results on the importance of R&D cooperation as an explanatory
factor of the innovation input and output for firms in the German manufacturing industry.
Section 5 contains a summary of the main findings.
2. R&D Cooperation and Innovation Activities of Firms – Theoretical
Aspects
Firms are engaged in R&D cooperations because they allow the utilization of external resources -
technological opportunities - for own purposes directly and efficiently. Technological
3opportunities define the total amount of the currently existing and exploitable external resources
firms are faced with (Cohen, 1995; Dosi, 1988; Klevorick et al., 1995). Such opportunities are
diverse, varying in kind and usefulness not only between industries but also between firms. "Due
to variations in the degree of availability of these technological opportunities, innovations are
"cheaper" to realize ... This factor stands - in combination with others - behind the empirically
observable inter-industrial differences in the rates of technical progress, of total factor
productivity and of economic growth" (Harabi, 1995, p. 67). Strength and sources of
technological opportunities are important factors explaining firm-specific and cross-industry
variations in R&D intensity and R&D productivity (Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994; Nelson and
Wolff, 1997; Sterlacchini, 1994).
R&D cooperations are an efficient strategy for adapting external resources only if the cost-
benefit-relationship ('trade-off') of joint R&D is positive or at least can be expected to be
positive. The benefits of joint R&D (Becker and Peters, 1998; Camagni, 1993; Robertson and
Langlois, 1995) can be described as follows:
- joint financing of R&D,
- avoiding multiple and wasteful duplication of R&D,
- reducting uncertainty,
- realizing cost-savings,
- realizing economies of scale and scope,
- shortening development times.
The disadvantages of joint R&D are caused by transaction costs (Coase, 1937; Pisano, 1990;
Williamson, 1989) especially to coordinate, manage and control the R&D activities of different
actors. Transaction costs are mainly related to the following topics:
- unification of heterogeneous structures, decision-making processes, etc.,
- coordination of distinct organizational routines, styles, etc.,
- combination of complementary assets, resources, etc.,
- fixation of transfer prices of intangible goods, for example information or know-how,
- regulation of the exploitation (appropriation) of the results (rates of return) of joint R&D.
Further, R&D cooperations are faced with hidden and unexpected risks, such as insufficient
quality of assets, delays in development time, failure of research success, change in the relative
contractual (market) power of the partners, etc. In addition, opportunistic behaviour, such as
moral hazard problems can occur. Because single R&D efforts are not directly observable,
partners tend to focus on their own profit when choosing their level of R&D investment.
4Governance modes to organize technological cooperations, such as cross-licencing agreements or
R&D joint ventures can help to avoid moral hazard (Gandal and Scotchmer, 1993; Hagedoorn,
1990; Morasch, 1995).
If the adaptation of external resources is cheaper than inhouse R&D, inter-organizational
arrangements in R&D are an efficient way to expand and optimize firms’ innovation activities
with positive effects on research efficiency, profitability and ability to compete. R&D
cooperations offer possibilities of efficient knowledge transfer, resource exchange and
organizational learning.3 Durable, but limited collaborations in well-defined research fields,
leaving aside the possibility of competition in the market (‘pre-competitive stage’), allow the
stable and comprehensive adaptation of resources needed. Complementary assets, technological
capabilities can be combined and merged, generating synergies and cross-fertilization effects.
In recent years, numerous analytical contributions have emerged trying to formalize the
incentives of firms to engage in R&D cooperation using oligopoly models with strategic
interactions between firms (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; de Bondt and Veuglers, 1991;
Katz, 1986; Motta, 1992; Steurs, 1995; Suzumura, 1992). Following the game-theoretic approach
the effects of cooperation on the innovation process have been examined predominantly by two-
stage models of oligopolistic/duopoly competition. Accordingly, private incentives for R&D
agreements are high, if external resources (technological opportunities) are sufficiently large,
usable with positive effects on the level of R&D investment, output and social welfare.
To judge the innovation effects of R&D cooperation precisely, it is critical to distinguish whether
external resources are used either as substitutes or complements.4 R&D cooperation - given a
certain initial state A5 - leads to a reduction of R&D efforts, if ceteris paribus a substitution effect
of inhouse R&D occurs.6 If external R&D resources are used complementary, then, ceteris
                                                
3 To the concept of organizational (mutual) learning see: Brown and Duguid, 1991; Powell, Koput and Smith-
Doerr, 1996; Simonin, 1997.
4 For the role of substitutive and complementive effects in the innovation process see: Arora and Gambardella,
1990; David, Hall and Toole, 2000.
5 The conditions of establishing R&D cooperation are seen as given.
6 This suggests that the production of new or improved products requires idiosyncratic and generic R&D efforts.
Whereas idiosyncratic R&D focuses on generating firm-specific knowledge, generic R&D produces knowledge
that is easy to access also by other actors (R&D spillovers). Given a certain degree of efficiency in the production
of generic knowledge, cooperations with other firms and organizations turn out to be profitable if the costs of
searching and processing are lower than the costs of internal knowledge production. A substitution of the generic
part of internally produced knowledge reduces total R&D expenditure. Concerning the generic production of
knowledge costs are driven down, whereas in the idiosyncratic knowledge production costs can not be higher
then status quo ante. For a formal analysis see: Becker and Peters, 1999; Harhoff, 1996.
5paribus an increase (decrease) of inhouse R&D leads to an enhancement (reduction) of firms’
R&D expenditures.
Further, the innovation effects of R&D cooperation depend on the number of partners. It can be
expected that networking effects of inter-organizational arrangements in R&D rise with the
number of partners cooperating efficiently with each other. Hereby, firms can establish inter-
industry agreements (Katz and Ordover, 1990; Mowery, 1989; Vonortas, 1997a)7 and/or
collaborate with institutions outside the industrial sector; especially universities and public
research institutes (Faulkner and Senker, 1994; Lee, 1996; Leyden and Link, 1999).
For the empirical analysis the theoretically expected effects of successfully R&D cooperation on
the innovation activities of firms can be summarized as follows: First, the adaptation of external
resources within such collaborations leads to an extension of firms’ technological capabilities to
develop new and improved products. This becomes evident in an increase of technological know-
how and improved skills. Second, assets, resources and information transferred in R&D
cooperation improve the research efficiency of firms. Such effects can be observed by higher
rates of return of R&D with positive impacts on firms’ innovation input and output. Third, the
number of partners cooperating efficiently with each other affects the efforts of firms to develop
new products positively.
3. Data Set, Variables and Estimation Methods
3.1. Data Set and Variables
For the empirical analysis data from the first wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP-93)
conducted in the German manufacturing8 industry are used. About 2,900 firms participated in the
survey and filled in a questionnaire about their innovation activities in the period 1990-1992. A
total of 2,048 firms were included in the empirical investigations.
                                                
7 A particular type of industrial collaborations are strategic alliances (Beamish, 1998; Gerybadze, 1995; Lorange
and Roos, 1992). Strategic alliances are very often a typical feature of a network of firms that show multiple
relationships (Jarillo, 1995; Thorelli, 1986). According to Harrigan (1988), these networks can be called 'spider-
web cooperations'. Other forms of inter-firm arrangements are R&D joint ventures (Gandal and Scotchmer,
1993; Link, 1996; Vonortas, 1997b). In the following, no differences are made between these specific types of
R&D cooperation.
8 The empirical investigations are focussed on the German manufacturing industry because more than 90 per cent
of the entire R&D expenditures of private firms are conducted in the secondary sector (Bundesministerium für
Bildung und Forschung, 1999).
6The MIP-93 data set defines the frame for the specifications of the variables in the econometrical
investigations.9 Unless otherwise noted, all data relate to the year 1992. The dependent variables
reflecting the innovation input and output of firms in the German manufacturing industry are
listed in Table 1, including descriptive statistics.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
The innovation input variable R&D_INT - defined as R&D expenditures to sales ratio - measures
firms’ intensity to develop new and improved products. The log of this intensity is computed
because of the problems with non-normal distributions. Firms’ innovation output are measured
by a dummy variable IN_RE_PRD indicating the realization of product innovations in the period
1990-1992.
In Table 1, independent variables explaining the innovation behaviour of firms in the German
manufacturing industry are also listed. To capture innovation effects of R&D cooperation, two
variables are integrated in the econometrical estimations. The variable COOP is used to identify
firms within R&D cooperations. Members of inter-organizational arrangements in R&D are
defined as firms taking part in joint R&D projects with others in the year 1992. Bivariate analysis
indicates a close correlation between regularity of inhouse R&D and membership in R&D
cooperation. Therefore, it can be assumed that firms cooperating with other firms and institutions
in 1992 have been members in R&D cooperation in the years before.
We generate the variable COOP_CLA to measure the networking effect of inter-organizational
arrangements in R&D. By doing so, it can be investigated how the number of partners
cooperating efficiently with each other affects the intensity of R&D/innovation activities.
In the econometrical models, variables reflecting firms’ restrictions in the innovation process
('barriers of innovation activities') are taken into consideration. By this, conditions affecting the
willingness to cooperate with others - in section 2 described as the benefits (advantages) of joint
R&D - are investigated. We use factor scores of five variables BAR_ generated by a factor
analysis of seventeen potential barriers of innovation (see Appendix A1).
To capture the influence of other firm-specific and environmental factors, different variables are
integrated in the estimations.10 Variables related to appropriability conditions (AP_) are
                                                
9 A detailed description of the MIP-1993 data set is given by: Harhoff and Licht, 1994.
10 In empirical studies working with the MIP 1993 data set, generally a variable EAST is implemented in the
regressions to control for location effects in East Germany (e.g., Felder et al., 1996; König and Licht, 1995). East
German firms have received many tax incentives and subsidies from the government in order to support their
7employed because the extent to which firms can protect their knowledge from others affects the
innovation activities of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; König and Licht, 1995; Levin et al.,
1987). The better firms can secure their knowledge against others and retain the returns of their
R&D, the higher the incentives for inhouse R&D are.11 In the estimations, scores of factor
analysis on firm-specific and law-specific mechanism of protecting internal knowledge
(AP_FIRM, AP_LAW) are used (see Appendix A2). Additionally, factor scores of different aims
of innovation activities (AIM_) reflecting firms’ motivation to be engaged in the development of
new and improved products are implemented (see Appendix A3). Because of their heterogeneous
character, the expected effects of the different aims on firms’ innovation activities can hardly be
defined.
To capture the influence of market-related factors, the variables firm size (SIZE_SALE),
intensity of international sales (INTERNAT) and degree of diversification (DIVERS) are
integrated in the estimations. These factors reflect the importance of order and demand in the
innovation process. The role of firm size in the innovation process is a priori difficult to assess
because this variable "... can be used as a proxy for various economic effects" (Arvanitis and
Hollenstein, 1996, p. 18). It is a proxy for scale effects in the knowledge production, the
capacities to specialize innovation activities and the ability to perform (applied) research
efficiently. Following Schumpeter (1942), a positive correlation between absolute size of a firm
and innovation expenditures can be expected. Large firms can benefit from economies of scale in
R&D and production. Otherwise, empirical evidence could be found that the share of R&D in
sales of large firms is lower than that of small firms (Acs, 1999; Acs and Audretsch, 1991;
Kleinknecht, 1996). The innovation effects of demand factors are less ambiguous. It can be
assumed that high export shares of sales (Felder et al., 1996; Wakelin, 1998) and degree of
diversification (Kamien and Schwartz, 1982; Nelson, 1959) stimulate firms’ innovation
activities.
                                                                                                                                                            
development. In regression with EAST as independent variable, not reported here, we found mostly similiar
patterns as reported in section 4.
11 Appropriability conditions and R&D spillovers are closely related (Cohen, 1995; Griliches, 1992). R&D
spillovers are externalities beyond their primary definition, where not alone the innovator has the benefit, but also
other actors can apply them for own purposes (Encaoua et al., 2000; Levin and Reiss, 1988). Appropriability
problems caused by R&D spillovers may firms motivate to underinvest in R&D because they can not completely
internalize the benefit from their private engagement in the development of innovations. In general, the higher
(lower) the appropriability conditions of firms are, the less (more) R&D spillovers will occur.
8To measure the importance of technological opportunities,12 we distinguish technological
opportunities stemming from suppliers (TEC_SUPP), customers and competitors (TEC_CUCO)
and scientific institutions (TEC_SCIE). Scores generated by a factor analysis of nine external
scources of technological information are used in the estimations (see Appendix A4). In general,
the higher the importance of external (knowledge) resources, the higher firms’ inhouse
capabilities to develop new and improved products are (Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994;
Gambardella, 1992; Levin and Reiss, 1988). Along this line, the higher the level of technological
opportunities, the higher the motivation of a firm will be to become engaged in the innovation
process.
To capture the influence of industry-specific conditions, a variable on the degree of market
concentration (COMP_INT) is integrated in the estimations. The influence of market structure
on firms’ innovation behaviour is ambiguous. On the one hand, empirical studies indicate
positive effects of market (industrial) concentration on R&D intensity (Geroski, 1994; Martin,
1994; Vossen, 1999). On the other hand, the degree of competition in the firms’ market has an
impact of comparable small order of magnitude on the innovation activities of firms, if the
estimations are controlled by variables of technological opportunities (Arvanitis and Hollenstein,
1996; Crépon, Duget and Kabla, 1996). Because firm size is not equally distributed within an
industry, the market share of a company is an additional indicator of market structure. As with
the market concentration, R&D intensity can be expected to increase with market share but level
off and may fall when a firm captures the whole market as monopolist.13
Further, industrial technology levels are used as independent variables. In the MIP-93 data set,
the manufacturing industry encloses eleven sectors. According to common OECD classification
(OECD, 1994, p. 94), these sectors are divided in three technology groups (LOW, MEDIUM,
HIGH). The variable HIGH is defined as basis group.
A firms’ innovation behaviour is closely linked to the development of an industry along with
technology and demand. At a given time, the technological regime (Audretsch, 1997; Nelson and
Winter, 1982) represents the specific environment of firms at the sectoral level. The features of
technological regimes, such as opportunity conditions, degree of cumulativeness of technological
knowledge and characteristics of the relevant knowledge base define "... the nature of the
                                                
12 We assume that the variables of technological opportunities can be used to measure especially the evidence of
R&D spillovers in the innovation process.
13 For the effects of buyer and supplier market concentration on the innovative behaviour of firms see: Farber,
1981; Geroski, 1995; Peters, 2000.
9problems that firms have to solve in their innovation activities, the incentives and constraints to
particular behaviours and the basic dynamics mechanism of evolution of firms, technologies and
industries" (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993, p. 46). These circumstances lead to specific patterns of
innovation activities in industries. In particular, firms in technology-based industries are forced
to be steadily active in the innovation process and secure their market competitiveness (Malerba,
Orsenigo and Peretto, 1997; Pavitt, 1984).
3.2. Estimation Methods and Econometric Specifications
To estimate the relationship between innovation activities of firms and R&D cooperation,
simultaneous equation systems are often used (Colombo, 1995; Colombo and Garrone, 1996;
Veugelers, 1997). Two main reasons for this can be mentioned. First, internal capacities are
necessary to exploit external resources within R&D cooperation. Second, the use of external
resources affects the intensity of the firms’ innovation engagement. Because of this included
endogenous variables in each equation are correlated with the disturbances (u's see below), so
that Ordinary Least Square (OLS) disregarding simultanity would lead to inconsistent estimators.
Further, estimation problems arise from the different scales of the dependent variables
R&D_INT, COOP and COOP_CLA (see Table 1).
To get unbiased estimation results adequate econometric models have to be used. To avoid
identification of single firms the available information for R&D_INT in the data set are censored
at point 0.35 (before logs are taken). Therefore, we use a Tobit model to capture this upper-
censoring. For COOP and COOP_CLA only discrete information is available so that a Probit or
Ordered Probit model are the appropriate estimation methods.
To take into account all these estimation problems we use a simultaneous equation model with
limited and/or qualitative dependent variables.14 The estimated models are illustrated below for
R&D_INT and COOP:
RRRC uXCOOPINTDR ++= ⋅ βγ **_&
CCCR uXINTDRCOOP ++= ⋅ βγ *_&*
0*0 ≤= COOPifCOOP ,
0*1 >= COOPifCOOP .
10
mINTDRifINTDRINTDR <= *_&*_&_& ,
mINTDRifmINTDR ≥= *_&_& .
where m represents the upper-censoring point at 0.35, XR and XC indicate the exogenous variables
in the corresponding equation, R&D_INT*, COOP*, uR and uC are unobservable random
variables. The actual value R&D_INT can be watched, if R&D_INT*<m. In the cases R&D_INT
*≥m, the only available information is that R&D_INT* lies in the range between m and ∞. For
COOP* only the sign is observable.
In the first step, the reduced form parameters are estimated for the COOP equation with the
Probit method and for the R&D_INT equation with the upper-censored Tobit model including all
exogenous variables. In the second step, these estimations are inserted in the structural form.
Following Amemiya's principle, the structural parameters can be estimated efficiently by
Generalized Least Square (GLS) using the defined relation between the reduced and structural
form.15 The asymptotic covariance matrix is calculated using Lee's (1992) estimation procedure,
which is more flexible to the scale of the dependent variable (see also Wilde, 1999).
For innovation output, the findings of the two-step equation method as described above indicate
no simultaneous relationship between the innovation output (IN_RE_PR) and cooperative
behaviour (COOP and COOP_CLA) (see section 4.2.2.). Therefore, a single equation model
builds the adequate analytical framework. We use a Probit respectively a Ordered Probit model
(see e.g. Greene, 1997; Ronning, 1991).
4. Results of the Empirical Analysis
In the following, the findings of the empirical investigations with special attention to the
importance of R&D cooperations as an innovation factor are described and discussed. Before we
point out the econometrical results, descriptive information about the evidence of R&D
cooperation in the German manufacturing industry is given.
                                                                                                                                                            
14 For more details to this kind of simultaneous equation systems see: Blundell and Smith, 1993; Lee, 1981;
Maddala, 1983.
15 For more details see: Amemiya, 1978; 1979.
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4.1. Evidence of R&D Cooperation in the German Manufacturing Industry
In 1992, about 37 per cent of firms had formed inter-organizational arrangements in R&D with
one or more partners to develop new products jointly (see Table 1). Obviously, R&D cooperation
is a crucial instrument for firms to gain and implement external resources efficiently. As
expected, the part of cooperating firms in the German manufacturing industry varies considerably
over sectors. The range reaches from approximately 17 per cent in the wood sector up to about
53 per cent in the vehicle/automobile sector.
Further, regarding the number of cooperation partners considerable differences between firms
exist. Approximately 61 per cent of cooperating firms work together with up to three partners.
About 29 per cent have R&D agreements with four up to six partners, and 10 per cent collaborate
with seven or more other firms or institutions.
4.2. Innovation Effects of R&D Cooperation
We now focus on the econometrical analysis of the effects of joint R&D on the innovation input
and output of firms. The estimation strategy is as follows: In Model 1, we measure the
innovation effects of R&D cooperation in general (COOP) among other exogenous variables. In
Model 2, we use additional information on R&D cooperations of firms and investigate how the
number of cooperation partners (COOP_CLA) affects the firms’ innovation behaviour. Both
model specifications are tested with and without the variables of technological opportunities to
check the robustness of the estimations, because cooperation is closely connected with
technological opportunities and may measure similar effects at least to a certain degree.
4.2.1. Effects on Innovation Input
Using a simultaneous equation system, the estimation results for the effects of R&D cooperation
on the firms’ inhouse intensities (R&D_INT) are listed in Table 2.16 By this, we investigate
whether external resources within such collaborations are used as substitutes or complements to
inhouse activities.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
                                                
16 In regressions, not reported here, we find similiar results for INNO_INT (innovation expenditures to sales ratio).
Besides R&D, innovation expenditures include also the firms’ investment in product design, trial production,
purchase of patents and licenses, etc.
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Collaborations with other firms and institutions enhance the innovation engagement of firms in
the German manufacturing industry. In both specifications of Model 1, the coefficient for COOP
is highly significant (at the 0.01 level), pointing out a complementary relationship between
cooperative agreements in R&D and the level of the firms’ innovation input. These findings are
in line with work done in other countries (Colombo, 1995; Leyden and Link, 1991; Sakakibara,
1997; Veugelers, 1997). R&D cooperations motivate firms to invest more in the development of
innovations. Inter-organizational arrangements in R&D expand technological capabilities with
stimulating impacts on the firms’ research intensity.
The estimations for Model 2 underline impressively the networking effects of inter-organizational
R&D arrangements. The number of partners (COOP_CLA) cooperating efficiently with each
other affects the intensity of firms’ R&D activities positively. The mix of heterogeneous actors in
R&D cooperation enfolds synergetics and enhance research productivity in a specific way. This
underlines the importance of networking effects in the innovation process (Autio 1997; Love and
Roper, 1999; Malerba and Torrisi, 1992; OECD, 2001).
The results for the other exogenous variables in Model 1 and 2 correspond mostly to the
theoretically expected signs. A high degree of appropriability conditions motivates firms in the
German manufacturing industry to invest in the development of new and improved products.
Firm-specific strategies to protect knowledge from other companies (AP_FIRM) increase the
level of innovation engagement. Mechanisms of protecting innovations by law (AP_LAW) have
significant effects on the intensity of R&D investments (at the 0.01 level).
Looking at the five variables AIM_ generated by a factor analysis of twenty potential aims of
innovation activities, the expansion of demand abroad (AIM_DEMA) and the enlargement of
production program (AIM_PROD) have positive effects on R&D_INT (significant at the 0.01
level). Contrary, the improvement of environmental issues (AIM_ENVI) leads to an reduction of
the firms’ R&D expenditures.
The effect of firm size (SIZE_SALE) on the level of firms’ R&D expenditures are negative and
significant (at the 0.05 level). Large firms in the German manufacturing industry spend less
money in order to develop innovations - compared to their sales - than small firms. These
findings correspond with studies from other countries (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Arvanitis,
1997; Evangelista et al., 1997). Obviously, the intensity of the firms’ R&D rises less than
proportional with size. "Perhaps it is the kind of specialisation underlying the innovative
behaviour of small and big firms which allows small firms to innovate without noticeable
disadvantages" (Arvanitis 1997, p. 487).
13
In addition, the regressions indicate highly significant effects of the market-related variable
INTERNAT. Firms’ R&D intensities rise with the share of international sales. The coefficients
for the variable DIVERS - degree of diversification – are also positive, but lack statistical
significance. Both findings support the demand-pull hypothesis (Felder et al., 1996; Kleinknecht
and Verspagen, 1990; Wakelin, 1998).
The results for the variables of technological opportunities are different. In both model
specifications (Model 1a and 2a), the coefficients for suppliers as external knowledge source
(TEC_SUPP) are negative and highly significant (at the 0.01 level). This can be explained by the
fact that suppliers' information tend to be a substitute for inhouse activities, as also found in
studies for the US (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Nelson and Wolff, 1997). Further, the
regressions indicate positive impacts of a high assessment of customers and competitors
(TEC_CUCO) and universities and research institutes (TEC_SCIE) as external knowledge
sources on firms’ R&D intensity. These results are consistent with other findings (Becker and
Peters, 2000; Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998; Mansfield and Lee, 1996). The strong
significance (at the 0.01 level) of TEC_CUCO is remarkable. Contrary, the coefficients for
TEC_SCIE lack significance.
The effects of industry-specific variables are ambiguous. The coefficient for market
concentration (COMP_INT) is positive and significant (at the 0.05 level). This coincides with
the theoretically expected sign. Further, the estimations indicate expected (highly significant)
effects of industrial technology levels (LOW, MEDIUM). The lower (higher) this level, the less
(more) intensive firms’ investments in R&D are.
In Table 2 also, the findings for COOP and COOP_CLA as dependent variable in the
simultaneous equation system are reported.17 In general, intensity of inhouse R&D (R&D_INT)
has stimulating, complementary effects (significant at the 0.01 level) on the probability that firms
in the German manufacturing industry are engaged in R&D cooperation. By this, the existence of
innovation barriers (BAR_) raises the engagement of firms to cooperate with others in R&D to
overcome these restrictions. In particular, firms in the German manufacturing industry are
                                                
17 To estimate the determinants of R&D cooperation in the simultaneous equation model, the set of explanatory
factors for firms’ R&D intensity is used with slight modifications. In line with theoretical and empirical studies
(Colombo, 1995; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Katz and Ordover, 1990; Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992; Motta,
1992; Vonortas, 1997a), firm characteristics, market (demand) structure and industrial peculiarities are used as
explanatory variables. Contrary to the estimations for R&D_INT, we insert variables of firms’ innovation barriers
(BAR_) in the estimations for COOP and COOP_CLA as dependent variables and left out factors capturing the
firms’ motivations of being engaged in the innovation process (AIM_).
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interested in such cooperations when costs and riskness of innovation activities (BAR_COST),
and financial restrictions (BAR_FIN) are high. As shown in other studies (Peters and Becker,
1999; Veugelers, 1997; Vonortas, 1997a), the adaptation of external resources within R&D
cooperation leads to an extension of firms’ capabilities of developing new products. Firms are
aware that they must establish R&D cooperations to obtain expertise which cannot be generated
inhouse.
Positive, highly significant coefficients for BAR_MARK (significant at the 0.01 level) indicate
that unsufficient market impulses and demand conditions stimulate the firms’ willingness to
cooperate. The (insignificant) results for BAR_TEC are ambiguous: Restrictions in internal
technological resources vary in the estimations with and without variables of technological
opportunities (TEC_). Further research has to be done to investigate this point in detail.
Differences to the estimations for R&D_INT as dependent variables are founded especially for
the market-related variables SIZE_SALE and INTERNAT. The likelihood to cooperate in R&D
rises with firm size measured by the level of sales (see also Fritsch and Lukas, 2001). Contrary, it
decreases with the share of international sales. This may reflect the fact that less cooperative
firms do basic innovations for international markets than non-cooperative firms for domestic
markets. In this context, Roper and Love (2001) found that German innovative and non-
innovative firms do not differ with respect to their export performance and they doing more
incremental innovations.
Further, the regressions underline the role of technological opportunities as determinants of R&D
cooperation. The higher the importance of external (knowledge) resources from suppliers
(TEC_SUPP) and scientific institutions (TEC_SCIE) are, the higher the firms’ motivation of
being engaged in joint R&D are (at the 0.01 level). Two arguments can be given for this: First,
by using their market power firms are able to shift R&D expenditures by cooperation agreements
towards their suppliers (see R&D equation Model 1a and 2a). Second, if firms rate scientific
institutions as important sources of information, they establish formal R&D agreements because
there exists no permanent market relation, e.g. a product exchange through which firms are able
to acquire information.
In contrast, the effects of technological opportunities from customers and competitors
(TEC_CUCO) are negative and highly significant. Information stemming from customers and
competitors are associated with higher R&D expenditures. This lowers the probability
(readiness) to cooperate in R&D. Obviously, the cost-benefit-relationship of joint R&D (as
described in section 2) is expected to be negative.
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The effect of industrial technology levels on the participation in R&D cooperation is also
contrary to the estimations for R&D_INT. The lower the industrial technology level, the higher
the likelihood of joint R&D. In sectors with low R&D intensity there are only few possibilities
for firms to mark off from competition. With the help of cooperation partners firms – especially
small ones - are able to overcome this shortcoming and master the development of complex and
risky technologies (Acs, 1999; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Pfirrmann 1998).
4.2.2. Effects on the Innovation Output
 We use the set of explanatory factors as on the input level but with slight modifications to
estimate the effects of R&D cooperation on the innovation output of firms in the German
manufacturing industry. The impacts are analyzed for the realization of new products
(IN_RE_PRD).
 In a first step, we use the same estimation techniques and models as in section 4.2.1. for
R&D_INT, but no simultaneous relationship between innovation output and R&D cooperation
could be detected. This may be due to the fact that only relatively few (nominal) information on
the realization of new products is available. 88 per cent of the non-cooperating firms in the data
set are innovative so that there is little difference to cooperating firms. Because of this we use a
single equation Probit model. Table 3 presents the results of these estimations.18 Because only
few empirical studies exist on the innovation output effects of R&D cooperation, we cannot
discuss our results to the extent as done for the input side in section 4.2.1.
 INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
 Looking at R&D cooperation as a whole (COOP), positive output effects can be generally
recognized. Collaborations with other firms and institutions enhance the probability of realizing
new products (at the 0.01 level). Joint R&D has stimulating impacts on the realization of product
innovations. Similar to the innovation input side, the complementary effect of using external
resources within such inter-organizational arrangements dominates.
 Further, the estimations indicate positive output effects of the number of partners (COOP_CLA)
cooperating efficiently with each other. The realization of new products rises with the number of
actors in R&D cooperation. This underlines the networking effects of inter-organizational R&D
arrangements.
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 The estimation results for the other exogenous variables are also listed in Table 3. Not suprising,
the intensity of firms’ R&D expenditures (R&D_INT) has stimulating, highly significant effects
on the probability to develop product innovations. Additionally, appropriability conditions
(AP_) affect the realization of new products positively.
 Further, the effect of firm size (SIZE_SALE) on the innovation output in the German
manufacturing industry is positive with highly significance. The likelihood of realizing product
innovations rises with the level of sales. These findings strengthen the presumption that larger
firms work more efficiently on the realization of new products as smaller firms, although they
invest less in their R&D activities as shown in section 4.2.1. In addition, the demand-related
variables degree of diversification (DIVERS) and level of international sales (INTERNAT)
indicate positive impacts on firms’ innovation output.
 Sources of technological opportunities (TEC_) have different effects on IN_RE_PRD. The
higher firms rank the importance of external knowledge from customers and competitors
(TEC_CUCO), the higher the probability to develop new products is (at the 0.01 level). In
addition, for technological opportunities stemming from scientific institutions (TEC_SCIE) the
estimations indicate negative effects (at the 0.10 level). This result corresponds with the findings
of Arvanitis/Hollenstein (1996). They also found negative (but insignificant) effects of
technological opportunities stemming from scientific knowledge sources on the sales shares of
new products in the case of Swiss manufacturing firms. One reason that explains these findings
can be seen in the fact that knowledge from universities and research institutes affect the
development of new products more indirectly and improve the quality of products more
indirectly by increasing firms' R&D efficiency and enhancing inhouse technological capacities
rather than by generating technical advance directly. "What university research most often does
today is to stimulate and enhance the power of R&D done in industry .... By far the largest share
of the work involved in creating and bringing to practice new industrial technology is carried out
in industry, not in universities" (Rosenberg/Nelson 1994, 340). Nevertheless, the technological
opportunities proxy TEC_SUPP has negative impacts on IN_RE_PRD. The higher firms rank the
importance of external knowledge from suppliers, the lower the probability of realizing new
products. One explanation for this remains to the point that suppliers are often specialized in the
                                                                                                                                                            
18 Including variables reflecting firms’ aims and barriers in the estimations, the reported results do not change,
therefore they are left out.
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development of process innovations (Arvanitis/Hollenstein, 1996; Malerba, 1992; von Hippel,
1988).
 The estimation results for the industry-specific variables are similar to the effects on firms’
innovation input as reported in 4.1.2., but with much less significance. The coefficients for the
market concentration variable (COMP_INT) is positive. Further, the probability of realizing new
products decreases with the industrial technology level (LOW, MEDIUM).
5. Summary
Firms engaged in the innovation process are aware of the necessity of establishing R&D
cooperation to obtain expertise which cannot be generated inhouse. Thus, internal capabilities to
develop new products are improvable. Collaborations with other firms and institutions in R&D
offer a crucial way for innovative firms to make external resources usable because they offer
possibilities of intensive knowledge transfer, resource exchange and organizational learning.
Complementary assets and capabilities can be combined and merged generating synergies and
cross-fertilization effects.
Against this background, the aim of the paper was to analyze in a simultaneous equation
framework the role of R&D cooperation in the innovation process under two specific aspects.
First, the analysis was concentrated on the impact of R&D cooperations on firms’ innovation
input and output. Second, it was analyzed how the number of cooperation partners affects the
development of new products.
The importance of R&D cooperation as an innovation factor - in line with other exogenous
variables - was empirically investigated for firms in the German manufacturing industry. A set of
firm-specific, environmental and market-related variables was used to estimate the role of R&D
cooperation as a determinant of firms’ innovative behaviour. The estimation results for the
innovation effects of R&D cooperation can be summarized as follows:19
In the German manufacturing industry, R&D cooperations are used complementary in the
innovation process, enhancing the innovation input and output of firms measured by the intensity
of inhouse R&D respectively the realization of product innovations. On the input side, joint
R&D with other firms and institutions stimulates the intensity of inhouse R&D. The number of
partners cooperating efficiently with each other affects the intensity of firms’ R&D activities
                                                
19 In general, the results for the other exogenous variables used in the estimations correspond mostly to the
theoretically expected signs.
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positively. The mix of heterogeneous actors in R&D cooperation enfolds synergetics and
enhance research productivity in a specific way. Also, the intensity of inhouse R&D stimulates
the probability and the number of R&D cooperations with other firms and institutions. On the
output side, collaborations in R&D enhance the probability of realizing new products. Further,
the realization of product innovations rises with the number of actors in R&D cooperation. This
underlines the networking effects of inter-organizational R&D arrangements.
In further work, the relationship between R&D cooperation and innovation activities of firms has
to be analyzed under specific intra- and inter-sectoral aspects. In addition, the duration
(continuity) of such cooperation and the kind (intensity) of knowledge transfer and resource
exchange has to be taken more into consideration. Thereby, the decision-making processes and
the mechanism of generating synergies and cross-fertilization effects within R&D cooperation
can be uncovered. Further, the innovation effects of joint R&D have to be analyzed under
longitudinal (dynamic) aspects with special attention to regional innovation systems. Finally,
additional research has to be focussed on the importance of industry-specific conditions by the
partner selection. By doing so, information about the efficiency of R&D cooperation depending
on the type and number of partners can be gained and implications for the public policies can be
drawn.
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Table 1: List of variables
Variable Description Empirical Measurement Value
(Range)
Mean Std.
Dev.
Innovation Input and Output
R&D_INT R&D intensity Logs of R&D expenditures to sales ratio
(1992)
Metric -5.891 2.708
IN_RE_PRD Realization of product
innovations
1 = Realization of product innovations (1990
– 1992), 0 = otherwise
Nominal 0.755 0.430
R&D Cooperation
COOP Joint R&D activities with
other firms or institutions
1 = R&D cooperation in 1992,
0 = otherwise
Nominal 0.351 0.478
COOP_CLA Number of cooperation
partners
0 = no partners, 1 = 1 up to 3 partners,
2 = 4 up to 6 partners, 3 = 7 or more partners
Ordinal
(0-3)
0.419 0.762
Aims and Barriers of Innovation Activities
AIM_COST Aims of innovation activities Reduction of innovation costs (factor scores) Metric 0.016 0.999
AIM_DEMI Expansion of demand in the home country
(factor scores)
Metric -0.026 0.989
AIM_DEMA Expansion of demand abroad (factor scores) Metric 0.040 0.998
AIM_ENVI Improvement of environmental issues (factor
scores))
Metric 0.027 0.990
AIM_PROD Enlargement of production program (factor
scores)
Metric -0.018 1.008
BAR_COST Barriers of innovation
activities
Costs and riskness of innovation activities
(factor scores)
Metric -0.23 1.008
BAR_GOV Governmental intervention (factor scores) Metric 0.006 1.003
BAR_MARK Market impulse and demand condition
(factor scores)
Metric -0.017 0.995
BAR_TEC Internal technological resources (factor
scores)
Metric 0.008 0.994
BAR_FIN Financial restrictions (factor scores) Metric -0.002 0.998
Appropriability Conditions
Extent to which
technological knowledge can
be protected from others
AP_FIRM Firm-specific mechanism to protect
innovations (factor scores)
Metric -0.020 1.013
AP_LAW Mechanisms to protect innovations by law
(factor scores)
Metric 0.002 1.002
Market-related Factors
SIZE_SALE Firm size Sales in log Metric 2.825 2.093
DIVERS Degree of diversification Inverse of the sum of squared sales share for
the four major product groups
Metric 0.015 0.006
INTERNAT Intensity in international
sales
Foreign sales/whole sales Metric 0.182 0.226
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Technological Opportunities
TEC_SUPP
TEC_CUCO
Importance of external
knowledge to firms’
innovation activities Suppliers (factor scores)
Customers and competitors (factor scores)
Metric
Metric
0.007
0.004
1.006
1.005
TEC_SCIE Universities and scientific institutions (factor
scores)
Metric -0.028 0.998
Industry-specific Conditions
COMP_INT Development of competition
intensity (1990 – 1992)
Herfindahl index for industrial sectors Ordinal
(1-5)
3.863 0.902
LOW
MEDIUM
HIGH
Industrial technology levels Classification of German manufacturing
industries in technology levels according to
OECD (1994)
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
0.459
0.339
0.202
0.499
0.473
0.402
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Table 2: Simultaneous estimation results for R&D intensity (R&D_INT), R&D cooperation
(COOP), and number of R&D cooperation partners (COOP_CLA)
Model 1 a Model 1 b Model 2 a Model 2 b
R&D_INT COOP R&D_INT COOP R&D_INT COOP_CLA R&D_INT COOP_CLA
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
INTERCEPT -4.733***
(-11.463)
0.300***
(2.918)
-4.555***
(-9.107)
-0.296**
(-2.048)
-4.257***
(-8.497)
0.292***
(3.601)
-4.886***
(-11.779)
0.013
(0.109)
COOP 0.867***
(3.126)
0.786***
(3.632)
COOP_CLA 0.921***
(3.829)
0.797***
(3.237)
R&D_INT 0.239***
(14.832)
0.275***
(13.036)
0.358***
(28.999)
0.199***
(10.961)
AIM_COST -0.075
(-1.227)
-0.049
(-0.906)
-0.016
(-0.299)
-0.079
(-1.354)
AIM_DEMA 0.349***
(4.843)
0.322***
(4.459)
0.280***
(4.349)
0.385***
(5.091)
AIM_ENVI -0.223***
(-3.589)
-0.226***
(-4.173)
-0.168***
(-2.832)
-0.253***
(-4.327)
AIM_PROD 0.231***
(3.735)
0.268***
(4.723)
0.220***
(4.071)
0.264***
(4.246)
AIM_DEMI 0.027
(0.480)
0.034
(0.644)
0.036
(0.715)
0.047
(0.809)
BAR_COST 0.070***
(8.810)
0.085***
(7.685)
0.070***
(11.389)
0.069***
(7.317)
BAR_GOV 0.076***
(9.214)
0.116***
(9.750)
0.068***
(10.063)
0.111***
(11.535)
BAR_MARK 0.120***
(14.359)
0.111***
(9.495)
0.107***
(16.219)
0.129***
(13.080)
BAR_TEC -0.032***
(-3.962)
0.031***
(2.960)
0.047***
(7.990)
-0.041***
(-4.230)
BAR_FIN 0.076***
(8.234)
0.102***
(7.921)
0.068***
(9.828)
0.092***
(8.136)
AP_FIRM 0.128*
(1.887)
0.044***
(4.762)
0.045
(0.756)
0.045***
(3.796)
0.046
(0.858)
0.001
(0.191)
0.137**
(1.971)
0.063***
(5.788)
AP_LAW 0.197***
(3.252)
-0.060***
(-6.389)
0.260***
(4.539)
-0.085***
(-6.097)
0.256***
(4.855)
-0.161***
(-20.933)
0.223***
(3.512)
-0.026**
(-2.232)
SIZE_SALE -0.115**
(-2.511)
0.139***
(30.194)
-0.131**
(-2.013)
0.271***
(37.212)
-0.168***
(-2.668)
0.235***
(61.707)
-0.094*
(-1.938)
0.164***
(29.219)
INTERNAT 0.910***
(3.032)
-0.230***
(-5.162)
0.989***
(3.495)
-0.081
(-1.353)
0.766***
(2.844)
-0.097***
(-2.964)
1.050***
(3.415)
-0.230***
(-4.276)
DIVERS 8.425
(0.928)
10.728***
(8.773)
14.373*
(1.798)
5.793***
(3.541)
10.814
(1.481)
3.317***
(3.841)
11.947
(1.280)
12.281***
(8.234)
TEC_SUPP -0.208***
(-3.528)
0.037***
(4.226)
-0.244***
(-4.480)
0.100***
(15.147)
TEC_CUCO 0.190***
(3.131)
-0.138***
(-17.128)
0.198***
(3.968)
-0.134***
(-20.436)
TEC_SCIE 0.074
(0.696)
0.183***
(18.548)
-0.047
(-0.416)
0.236***
(31.997)
COMP_INT 0.131**
(2.095)
0.005
(0.584)
0.134**
(2.309)
-0.009
(-0.735)
0.125**
(2.342)
-0.012*
(-1.789)
0.135**
(2.113)
-0.000
(-0.006)
LOW -1.273***
(-7.434)
0.080**
(2.372)
-1.456***
(-10.521)
0.364***
(8.228)
-1.378***
(-10.633)
0.412***
(16.325)
-1.342***
(-8.008)
0.057
(1.439)
MEDIUM -0.826***
(-5.327)
0.073***
(2.907)
-0.951***
(-6.845)
0.249***
(7.464)
-0.869***
(-6.668)
0.243***
(12.690)
-0.870***
(-5.653)
0.077***
(2.655)
Number of
observations
1169 1169 1171 1171 1085 1085 1087 1087
Adj. R2 0.579 0.248 0.626 0.318 0.092 0.129 0.307 0.335
Notes:   * significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level,  *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Table 3: Probit estimation results for the realization of new products (IN_RE_PRD)
Model 1 a Model 1 b Model 2 a Model 2 b
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
Coeff.
(t-value)
INTERCEPT 1.501***
(3.172)
1.596***
(3.523)
1.548***
(3.158)
1.663***
(3.547)
COOP 0.544***
(2.601)
0.446**
(2.249)
COOP_CLA 0.231
(1.224)
0.145
(0.834)
R&D_INT 0.143***
(4.706)
0.153***
(5.317)
0.160***
(4.971)
0.171***
(5.616)
AP_FIRM 0.094
(1.502)
0.101*
(1.776)
0.094
(1.479)
0.103*
(1.785)
AP_LAW 0.110
(1.491)
0.073
(1.088)
0.105
(1.378)
0.068
(0.986)
SIZE_SALE 0.127***
(3.090)
0.119***
(3.034)
0.129***
(2.987)
0.120***
(2.936)
INTERNAT 0.593
(1.317)
0.657
(1.569)
0.603
(1.331)
0.698*
(1.659)
DIVERS 35.999**
(2.145)
35.464**
(2.206)
41.409**
(2.348)
40.856**
(2.417)
TEC_SUPP -0.069
(-0.937)
-0.076
(-1.012)
TEC_CUCO 0.190***
(3.050)
0.201***
(3.127)
TEC_SCIE -0.143*
(-1.894)
-0.139*
(-1.756)
COMP_INT 0.035
(0.483)
0.015
(0.209)
0.038
(0.499)
0.011
(0.151)
LOW -0.159
(-0.750)
-0.122
(-0.613)
-0.117
(-0.542)
-0.077
(-0.382)
MEDIUM -0.021
(-0.092)
0.004
(0.020)
-0.053
(-0.227)
-0.013
(-0.058)
Number of
observations
1222 1239 1131 1148
Log likelihood -214.265 -229.578 -204.597 -220.137
R2McFadden 0.261 0.240 0.264 0.242
Notes:   * significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level,  *** significant at the 0.01 level.
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Appendix A1: Barriers of innovation activities - Factor scores
Factor
BAR_COST
Factor
BAR_GOV
Factor
BAR_MARK
Factor
BAR_TEC
Factor
BAR_FIN
BAR_5 0.799 0.077 0.064 0.094 0.157
BAR_6 0.795 0.085 0.083 0.080 0.044
BAR_1 0.707 0.073 0.157 0.099 0.051
BAR_2 0.672 0.102 0.144 0.138 0.122
BAR_7 0.586 0.095 0.096 0.139 0.050
BAR_13 0.084 0.888 0.096 0.072 0.066
BAR_12 0.086 0.884 0.086 0.091 -0.030
BAR_14 0.232 0.653 0.190 0.015 0.109
BAR_15 0.174 0.109 0.813 0.085 0.047
BAR_16 0.104 0.201 0.751 0.157 0.067
BAR_17 0.176 0.057 0.702 0.161 0.002
BAR_9 0.010 0.082 0.018 0.712 0.071
BAR_10 0.114 0.083 0.127 0.710 -0.045
BAR_11 0.078 0.094 0.120 0.677 0.115
BAR_8 0.210 -0.071 0.187 0.540 0.002
BAR_4 0.150 0.047 0.074 0.059 0.913
BAR_3 0.181 0.069 0.023 0.042 0.912
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.81; Bartlett-Test of sphericity: 13052.35
Appendix A2: Firms' appropriability conditions - Factor scores
Factor
AP_LAW
Factor
AP_FIRM
AP_PA_PR 0.820 0.033
AP_PA_PZ 0.815 0.147
AP_CO_PZ 0.788 0.165
AP_CO_PR 0.752 0.047
AP_DE_PZ 0.093 0.741
AP_LE_PZ 0.225 0.711
AP_LO_PZ -0.045 0.703
AP_LO_PR -0.047 0.615
AP_LE_PR 0.047 0.614
AP_SE_PZ 0.397 0.588
AP_LE_PR 0.300 0.548
AP_SE_PR 0.367 0.503
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.68; Bartlett-Test
of sphericity: 8837.76
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Appendix A3: Aims of innovation activitites - Factor scores
Factor
AIM_COST
Factor
AIM_DEMA
Factor
AIM_ENVI
Factor
AIM_DEMI
Factor
AIM_PROD
AIM_14 0.775 0.025 -0.096 0.038 0.108
AIM_15 0.723 0.059 0.118 0.034 0.107
AIM_17 0.696 0.064 0.259 0.068 0.080
AIM_18 0.584 0.050 0.416 -0.005 0.023
AIM_16 0.556 -0.030 0.497 0.118 -0.084
AIM_13 0.433 -0.047 0.370 0.140 0.231
AIM_9 0.034 0.880 -0.002 -0.063 0.089
AIM_8 0.003 0.816 0.090 -0.060 0.078
AIM_10 0.047 0.792 0.019 0.135 0.053
AIM_7 0.075 0.599 0.004 0.481 0.159
AIM_20 0.165 0.055 0.801 -0.001 -0.050
AIM_12 -0.072 0.118 0.702 0.050 0.243
AIM_19 0.335 -0.016 0.671 0.099 -0.025
AIM_11 0.224 -0.024 0.447 0.070 0.272
AIM_5 0.078 0.112 0.044 0.831 0.119
AIM_6 0.082 -0.038 0.131 0.793 0.103
AIM_2 0.089 0.015 0.045 0.119 0.670
AIM_1_ 0.068 0.240 -0.003 -0.089 0.661
AIM_3_ 0.008 0.007 0.105 0.171 0.553
AIM_4 0.073 0.048 0.047 0.032 0.438
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.82; Bartlett-Test of sphericity: 9720.49
Appendix A4: External sources of technological knowledge - Factor scores
Factor
TEC_SCIE
Factor
TEC_SUPP
Factor
TEC_CUCO
TEC_TI 0.851 0.019 0.051
TEC_UNIV 0.824 -0.032 0.019
TEC_RI 0.777 0.121 0.123
TEC_ADV 0.528 0.174 0.281
TEC_SUP_INV 0.127 0.855 0.003
TEC_SUP_PRE 0.017 0.850 0.112
TEC_CUST 0.083 0.048 0.821
TEC_COMP 0.138 0.054 0.816
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy: 0.72; Bartlett-Test of sphericity: 3072.62
